[D369-] 抗俄衛國 153: 習大大 all in or not all in

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大西北姿粉客 2023-03-09 05:54:08

所以好難運重武器

正義正HiHi 2023-03-09 08:41:55

所以乜野一戰封神既新聞全部刪哂

kaede512 2023-03-09 09:06:46

https://youtu.be/OKvcp3MYxQk

今日講 Bakhmut。

重點喺4:52，如烏克蘭累積足夠人力同裝備，好似果幅圖咁剪佐俄羅斯兩隻鉗係可能，而且Wagner Groups + 進攻中的俄匪精銳，會成個建制被圍殲

再觀望多幾日，睇下係唔係真係變成突出部2023

北面m1a2突擊，南面chellenger2同豹2a6包抄突破。

鬼二二 2023-03-09 10:24:56

希望只係個trap
否則都係早d走再佈防

機會一直在馬會 2023-03-09 10:36:44

城東收左皮
要走就快

兒登冧巴溫 2023-03-09 10:47:37

我相信巴赫姆特之戰將來會好似二戰市場菜園行動或者突出部之役，會拍成戰爭片

兒登冧巴溫 2023-03-09 10:49:49

打仗o既野贏戰役輸戰爭冇意思，二戰後期德國咪成日咁，個別部隊質素依然好高，不時搞到盟軍部隊重大傷亡，但最終大勢轉唔到，如果守落去代價重價值低，移防都係一個選擇

kaede512 2023-03-09 10:53:31

無論戰局點變化, 我都尊重烏克籣軍方的decision making. 繼續觀望.

隨同自由往盡頭 2023-03-09 11:29:44

https://acoup.blog/2023/02/24/collections-one-year-into-the-war-in-ukraine/

// Finally, Ukraine may be running out of soft targets and to explain that it’s worth taking a gander at Ukraine’s strategy here. Clausewitz notes (drink!) there are essentially three centers of gravity that force can be directed on to compel an opponent to yield: one can target enemy military forces, enemy political calculations or enemy public will.4 Ukraine has clearly chosen the former and that makes a lot of sense. Popular Will is a weak lever for a regime like Putin’s that has depoliticized much of its population and rules without public consent in any event, especially since Putin is clearly willing to shift much of the burden of the dying to disenfranchised people in his country. Striking at the Political Object is also effectively out of Ukraine’s hands because the potential for nuclear escalation constrains their ability to attack into Russian territory. That leaves destroying Russian military capacity.5

So how has Ukraine opted to do this? From the very beginning of the war, Ukraine has focused on targeting Russian logistics to force Russian units to retreat, rather than trying to attrit the Russian army out of existence. Ukrainian Armed Forces have consistently sought means to strike across Russian operational depth (that is, engage the front lines and rear echelon at the same time; again, we’ll talk about this more when we get to maneuver warfare) to render pressured front line positions logistically untenable so they have to be abandoned. Ukraine did that outside of Kyiv, they did it by taking Kupiansk during the Kharkiv offensive, they did it by putting pressure on Kherson while striking the Dnieper crossings and the Kerch Bridge. It’s an approach Ukraine has deployed repeatedly and is consistent with the old Soviet doctrine; it is a remarkable irony that the Russians are being beaten because the Ukrainians are better at Deep Operations.

But now that the war is largely positional in nature, the number of positions inside Ukraine which are both reachable by Ukrainian offensives and offer the ability to lever Russian forces out of territory by logistical important dwindles. As noted, logistics hubs in Russia are difficult for Ukraine to do more than harass without raising escalation concerns. Meanwhile, Ukraine has plucked the lowest hanging fruit in Kherson and Kupiansk. There are still key positions of vulnerability for Russia, but some of them are probably too far out of reach (the Kerch Bridge and the Isthmus of Perekop connecting Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland). The most obvious thing to do would be to try and cut the rail and road links through Melitopol, but that is a hard 50 mile advance over terrain that is by now heavily fortified by Russian forces and with substantial risk of counter-attacks on the edges of the salient a push like that would create. A similar push to Mariupol is similarly daunting. In Luhansk, taking Starobilsk would cut a rail line, but it’s not clear to me that doing so would jeopardize the actual key positions in Sievierdonetsk to the south; Donetsk Oblast is denser in roads and rail lines, making that logistical approach harder.//

kaede512 2023-03-09 12:08:30

https://twitter.com/new27brigade/status/1633678129117155328?s=20

雷比爾將軍：自護已無兵。

Fives 2023-03-09 13:42:04

意思係烏克蘭唔可以再打人哋補給，要直接打部隊？

厚斯廷堡 2023-03-09 14:07:40

孖貓 2023-03-09 15:45:59

https://www.facebook.com/393111421128291/posts/pfbid0F9wK25yHKXhgwfgzJjdtYSqYzmRXg9AvNMWX1WEQTP4Eg9Pg8JURhLKcRZaHB6N3l/?mibextid=Nif5oz

牧瀨紅莉棲 2023-03-09 17:00:10

唔駛覆佢架啦，由佢單機啦

Silovik 2023-03-09 18:09:59

俄毛其實咩心態

俄國都有人支持得落呢啲除咗滅絕人性仲可以講咩

Staff09 2023-03-09 18:34:32

你理解到畜生嘅諗法你就係賤畜啦

wenliyang 2023-03-09 19:32:31

呢個似係訊息戰多啲.
正常唔會放呢啲消息出黎.

kaede512 2023-03-09 19:39:33

我理解到喎，甚至連習近平，普京呢類神經病都大約知道佢哋想緊d乜。

但理解/知道對方想法唔代表認同，更加唔代表要照d神經病/瘋子的想法行事。只需要用行動回應呢d人：佢哋咁做的話就會有乜後果，將呢個後果實現出來就得。

wenliyang 2023-03-09 19:41:32

我唔認為係單純軍事決定.

維尼熊而家搖擺緊, 佢好想軍援俄國, 但又擔心後果,
亦疑惑於俄國能唔能夠贏, 或者俄國可以拖得幾耐.
澤仔想喺維尼熊決定軍援之前打一場大勝仗,
同全世界講俄軍輸梗, 你維尼熊幫佢只會枉作小人.
由整體戰略而言, 如果巴赫姆可以重挫俄軍而令中國放棄軍援,
係另一種斷俄國後援既方法, 如果由呢個觀點出發,
確實係有決戰烏東既需要. 增援巴赫姆,
唔單純係士氣波或者守護平民.
唯有呢一個觀點先可以說服美國歐盟, 同意烏軍增援烏東.

BTW, 我覺得維尼熊點都會軍援俄國.
所以我唔贊成決戰烏東.

wenliyang 2023-03-09 19:44:28

烏克蘭選擇左後者.

wenliyang 2023-03-09 20:00:44

呢單好笑, 勝利球迷會開始出黎搖旗

https://twitter.com/new27brigade/status/1633495510068895745

wenliyang 2023-03-09 20:04:23

夢想黨班友想做乜?
我無記錯, 格魯吉亞都係古阿姆成員.
佢[地唔想親歐? 你話佢地08年輸之後芬蘭化,
可以理解, 但想同歐洲斷開就比較奈人尋味.

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