(博奕論)北海道大學入學試題,1至100選最大數字

上面吹到nash equilibrium on the condition that all players are rational

但總有一班人比理性更理性，會諗多幾步，咁100咪會出事囉

真係入學試嘅話揀得100嘅可以將份卷歸零都得

唔係好明你意思

寫100 再大聲講因為100係冇得輸個d 可以直接dq唔收

一打唔洗找

個post好多文盲

睇題目咁基本都做唔到

搵一個人做媒
假設全場玩家都知發生咩事同清楚規則

一開始同上面講嘅一樣
沖出去話自己填左100
然後個frd再沖出黎做媒 話撞鳩自己個100
等大家由99開始再諗
但其實個frd冇填100

最後就確保得一個100

真心分析唔係鳩講架

搵一個人做媒
假設全場玩家都知發生咩事同清楚規則

一開始同上面講嘅一樣
沖出去話自己填左100
然後個frd再沖出黎做媒 話撞鳩自己個100
等大家由99開始再諗
但其實個frd冇填100

最後就確保得一個100

真心分析唔係鳩講架

前提係其他99個都信你係填100

重點係簡一個你鍾意既數字
不能重覆係指你鍾意既原因
呢題跟本唔係數學題

只係你唔明數學

意思係話你選既數字背後意義有幾大，
睇邊個最大

到底有幾多人係明條題目點解

點解咁多弱智

搵一個人做媒
假設全場玩家都知發生咩事同清楚規則

一開始同上面講嘅一樣
沖出去話自己填左100
然後個frd再沖出黎做媒 話撞鳩自己個100
等大家由99開始再諗
但其實個frd冇填100

最後就確保得一個100

真心分析唔係鳩講架

前提係其他99個都信你係填100

但如果呢個係入學試
唔似上面連登仔鳩填
學分當前都大冇謂去撞鳩佢個100？

太長唔想用中文打

The strategy of choosing 100 is a weakly dominant strategy.

Consider a player, Alice. We only need to consider two cases:

Case 1: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is strictly less than 100. Then, Alice can always win by choosing 100, but if she may lose if she chooses a number less than 100.

Case 2: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is 100. Then, Alice will lose no matter which number she chooses, so she is indifferent between all possible strategies.

The conclusion means that all (rational) players should choose 100, leading to a Nash equilibrium outcome in which all players gain zero point.

For case 2, u didn't consider that if there r more than one person choosing 100. Alice can still win if she is the only one who chooses 99.

未追哂post
首先傻仔一定揀100
賭仔心態會揀90-99
揀得過嘅得1-89
呢啲情況，㨂質數比較有利
而最大質數係89，但有89有9，依然有大嘅感覺，而且貼近90 range，相信依然係半熱門
數落去下一個係83，我會揀83

睇清題目未

點解咁多弱智

暑假啦

上面吹到nash equilibrium on the condition that all players are rational

但總有一班人比理性更理性，會諗多幾步，咁100咪會出事囉

真係入學試嘅話揀得100嘅可以將份卷歸零都得

唔係好明你意思

寫100 再大聲講因為100係冇得輸個d 可以直接dq唔收

9唔搭8 咩無啦啦咩大聲講
我意思game theory既話, 100岩
但現實100唔會岩

如果有一個由邏輯推導出黎既正確答案
咁呢個答案必然係錯（假設最少有兩個人有邏輯）

所以話佢係心理題錯唔曬

成班考緊獵人

太長唔想用中文打

The strategy of choosing 100 is a weakly dominant strategy.

Consider a player, Alice. We only need to consider two cases:

Case 1: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is strictly less than 100. Then, Alice can always win by choosing 100, but if she may lose if she chooses a number less than 100.

Case 2: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is 100. Then, Alice will lose no matter which number she chooses, so she is indifferent between all possible strategies.

The conclusion means that all (rational) players should choose 100, leading to a Nash equilibrium outcome in which all players gain zero point.

你即係冇撚講過野啊ching

未追哂post
首先傻仔一定揀100
賭仔心態會揀90-99
揀得過嘅得1-89
呢啲情況，㨂質數比較有利
而最大質數係89，但有89有9，依然有大嘅感覺，而且貼近90 range，相信依然係半熱門
數落去下一個係83，我會揀83

這麼認真地9Up 辛苦你了

太長唔想用中文打

The strategy of choosing 100 is a weakly dominant strategy.

Consider a player, Alice. We only need to consider two cases:

Case 1: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is strictly less than 100. Then, Alice can always win by choosing 100, but if she may lose if she chooses a number less than 100.

Case 2: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is 100. Then, Alice will lose no matter which number she chooses, so she is indifferent between all possible strategies.

The conclusion means that all (rational) players should choose 100, leading to a Nash equilibrium outcome in which all players gain zero point.

題目都未識睇

太長唔想用中文打

The strategy of choosing 100 is a weakly dominant strategy.

Consider a player, Alice. We only need to consider two cases:

Case 1: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is strictly less than 100. Then, Alice can always win by choosing 100, but if she may lose if she chooses a number less than 100.

Case 2: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is 100. Then, Alice will lose no matter which number she chooses, so she is indifferent between all possible strategies.

The conclusion means that all (rational) players should choose 100, leading to a Nash equilibrium outcome in which all players gain zero point.

實際上唔係

it sounds good but it never works

好明顯考你既唔係實際你填既數字而係背後既concept
呢個咪就係正確答案

贏既條件應該係揀到
冇同其他人重複既數入面, 最大既數
既如果其他人全揀100, 我就算揀1都贏到
所以case 2唔成立
就咁睇應該揀
n such that P(all unique numbers<n)*P(n is unique) is max
問題係唔知P(n is unique)係幾多

ching先係路，個抽game theory根本唔撚關事，rational player foresees 到個撚個會忠個頭埋去nash equilibrium就唔撚會揀 100啦

太長唔想用中文打

The strategy of choosing 100 is a weakly dominant strategy.

Consider a player, Alice. We only need to consider two cases:

Case 1: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is strictly less than 100. Then, Alice can always win by choosing 100, but if she may lose if she chooses a number less than 100.

Case 2: The largest number chosen by the rest of the group is 100. Then, Alice will lose no matter which number she chooses, so she is indifferent between all possible strategies.

The conclusion means that all (rational) players should choose 100, leading to a Nash equilibrium outcome in which all players gain zero point.

題目都未識睇

ching識野

有冇人有興趣開新post玩估平均值2/3

估唔到鳩填63會中
70-100唔會揀純覺得會太多人揀
0-59以下覺得太細，揀咗過唔到自己
69，67，64成日見唔會揀
68，有個8字唔揀
66，孖字
65，60，5嘅倍數唔揀
62，可以被2除唔揀
得返63，61
鳩撞
Btw，無成本有幾多人真係會用腦諗咗先填