成功賣台 (either 中or 美)之後拎舊錢去嘆世界
沈陣營第二百二十二期 － 師父租樓好開心
VicF
1001 回覆
7 Like
1 Dislike
第 1 頁第 2 頁第 3 頁第 4 頁第 5 頁第 6 頁第 7 頁第 8 頁第 9 頁第 10 頁第 11 頁第 12 頁第 13 頁第 14 頁第 15 頁第 16 頁第 17 頁第 18 頁第 19 頁第 20 頁第 21 頁第 22 頁第 23 頁第 24 頁第 25 頁第 26 頁第 27 頁第 28 頁第 29 頁第 30 頁第 31 頁第 32 頁第 33 頁第 34 頁第 35 頁第 36 頁第 37 頁第 38 頁第 39 頁第 40 頁第 41 頁
選總統 成功賣台 (either 中or 美)之後拎舊錢去嘆世界
成功賣台 (either 中or 美)之後拎舊錢去嘆世界班台仔窮得太耐, 聽到發財就中降頭咁
國家選地點做嘢經過考慮，有實際需要，當年英國要求清政府割讓香港島，主要係維港水域深，可以作為對馬拉行軍嘅補給點，嗰時英國佬喺東南亞國家如汶萊經常開片
港口夠深貨船拍到埋嚟
最記得聽過一個故事，話怡和大班登陸香港島，望住維港，問手下有股氣味係乜嘢味，佢手下答: 錢嘅氣味
港口夠深貨船拍到埋嚟
最記得聽過一個故事，話怡和大班登陸香港島，望住維港，問手下有股氣味係乜嘢味，佢手下答: 錢嘅氣味
今個月高買左, 留錢算
呢次發財，美帝會協助台灣取代香港作為亞洲金融中心地位，如果台股突然開放比全球資金買賣，資金自由進出，唔好意外，美帝轉移資產去台灣
郭台銘條撚屌啱啱去見完Trump,仲拎咗頂帽定唔知乜有Trump簽名嘅，之後又吹自己願意作為中美調解人，佢老味去摸底美帝意思就真
無利不早起商人本色
無利不早起商人本色
我肯定我嘅眼界高過港共官員好多，佢哋唔會諗到台灣可以作為亞洲金融中心嘅
Vic 巴選總統 
中華民國萬歲
中華民國萬歲
我早幾年寫左份論文, 係研究七十年代既房屋政策, 我入過檔案館睇文件
其實70-74年, 鍾逸傑已經同英國講97年既土地租約問題, 當時內部文件已經同殖民地部講緊, 呢件事要同大陸講數. 留意, 當時老毛未死, 文革未完, 戴卓爾都未上台. 但其實英國佬一早已經aware呢件事.
至於老毛, 其實文革去到68-69年打後佢已經控制唔到, 因為行政機構已經俾佢鬥到冧哂檔, 根本指唔郁任何人, 除左玩批鬥. 所以當時根本唔得閒理香港.
其實70-74年, 鍾逸傑已經同英國講97年既土地租約問題, 當時內部文件已經同殖民地部講緊, 呢件事要同大陸講數. 留意, 當時老毛未死, 文革未完, 戴卓爾都未上台. 但其實英國佬一早已經aware呢件事.
至於老毛, 其實文革去到68-69年打後佢已經控制唔到, 因為行政機構已經俾佢鬥到冧哂檔, 根本指唔郁任何人, 除左玩批鬥. 所以當時根本唔得閒理香港.
台灣定位我都諗緊
但又未諗到美國佬想放棄新加坡呢步
但又未諗到美國佬想放棄新加坡呢步
大學研究呢飯研究好深
其實再早D 係有討論過既, 1957年雙十暴動之後英國政府係有打算撤出香港既, 不過美帝之後同英國傾掂數, 香港先無咁早被解放, 而英國開始係香港由無為而治變成有為政府
reference book: Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations 1949-1957 by Chi-kwan Mark
After 1949, the British Empire in Hong Kong was more vulnerable than the lack of Chinese demand for return and the success of Hong Kong's economic transformations might have suggested. Its vulnerability stemmed as much from Britain's imperial decline and America's Cold War requirements as from a Chinese threat. It culminated in the little known ‘1957 Question’, a year when the British position in Hong Kong appeared more uncertain than any time since 1949. This is the first scholarly study that places Hong Kong at the heart of the Anglo–American relationship in the wider context of the Cold War in Asia. Unlike existing works, which tend to treat British and US policies in isolation, this book explores their dynamic interactions — how the two allies perceived, responded to, and attempted to influence each other's policies and actions. It also provides a major reinterpretation of Hong Kong's involvement in the containment of China. The author argues that, concerned about possible Chinese retaliation, the British insisted and the Americans accepted that Hong Kong's role should be as discreet and non-confrontational in nature as possible. Above all, top decision-makers in Washington evaluated Hong Kong's significance not in its own right, but in the context of the Anglo–American relationship: Hong Kong was seen primarily as a bargaining chip to obtain British support for US policy elsewhere in Asia. Using a variety of British and US archival material as well as Chinese sources, the author examines how the British and US government discussed, debated, and disagreed over Hong Kong's role in the Cold War, and reveals the dynamics of the Anglo–American alliance and the dilemmas of small allies in a global conflict.
其實再早D 係有討論過既, 1957年雙十暴動之後英國政府係有打算撤出香港既, 不過美帝之後同英國傾掂數, 香港先無咁早被解放, 而英國開始係香港由無為而治變成有為政府
reference book: Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations 1949-1957 by Chi-kwan Mark
After 1949, the British Empire in Hong Kong was more vulnerable than the lack of Chinese demand for return and the success of Hong Kong's economic transformations might have suggested. Its vulnerability stemmed as much from Britain's imperial decline and America's Cold War requirements as from a Chinese threat. It culminated in the little known ‘1957 Question’, a year when the British position in Hong Kong appeared more uncertain than any time since 1949. This is the first scholarly study that places Hong Kong at the heart of the Anglo–American relationship in the wider context of the Cold War in Asia. Unlike existing works, which tend to treat British and US policies in isolation, this book explores their dynamic interactions — how the two allies perceived, responded to, and attempted to influence each other's policies and actions. It also provides a major reinterpretation of Hong Kong's involvement in the containment of China. The author argues that, concerned about possible Chinese retaliation, the British insisted and the Americans accepted that Hong Kong's role should be as discreet and non-confrontational in nature as possible. Above all, top decision-makers in Washington evaluated Hong Kong's significance not in its own right, but in the context of the Anglo–American relationship: Hong Kong was seen primarily as a bargaining chip to obtain British support for US policy elsewhere in Asia. Using a variety of British and US archival material as well as Chinese sources, the author examines how the British and US government discussed, debated, and disagreed over Hong Kong's role in the Cold War, and reveals the dynamics of the Anglo–American alliance and the dilemmas of small allies in a global conflict.
大家都係估，所以任何可能都會，但我對新加坡嘅金融中心地位唔覺得會搞，想告政府嘅相關公司根本冇可能，淡馬錫從來黑箱作業，有冇人反對過?
港口不及台灣，地方太細，金融服務業伴隨嘅地產業，台灣地產業有機會做財富倉庫，新加坡我睇唔到
戰爭更冇可能，共匪唔敢武力，只會滲透，最好總統突然電視台宣佈歸中，屬於內政，美帝就難插手
所以美帝積極搞台灣入返聯合國，夠膽講日本會第一個承認台灣做國家
港口不及台灣，地方太細，金融服務業伴隨嘅地產業，台灣地產業有機會做財富倉庫，新加坡我睇唔到
戰爭更冇可能，共匪唔敢武力，只會滲透，最好總統突然電視台宣佈歸中，屬於內政，美帝就難插手
所以美帝積極搞台灣入返聯合國，夠膽講日本會第一個承認台灣做國家
呢個係朱古力味屎同屎味朱古力嘅分別，只係有一樣唔同，新加坡已經攞住亞太地區嘅經濟主導，要重新推一個新國家好似越南台灣咁，又要多幾十年同埋政策國管配合，無咁易
點解美帝唔直接發展東京做金融中心
架仔從來都唔係真心臣服美帝
好似以前年年去中國朝貢 你廢個陣就用D流寇海盜打鳩你
依家對美帝都一樣
好似以前年年去中國朝貢 你廢個陣就用D流寇海盜打鳩你
依家對美帝都一樣
人口減少得利害，老年化，留意吓金融中心必然伴隨地產業，樓價貴，NY如是，倫敦如是，香港如是，作為資金倉庫之一，日本地產唔掂
一日師父未開淡倉, 市場都會繼續扭曲
