但唔好好似上面條on9仔咁你一講獨就屌弱智 小朋友 自己去收窄自己人嘅討論空間
大家都係想要翻個自治權
你地可以認為同中共拉扯保持兩制個獨立性
但我價值觀會覺得齋靠保持翻原有嘅政治制度唔足夠去遊說國際香港保持到原有特性
呢個只係大家價值觀唔同對出路應該係點嘅睇法唔同
但我覺得唔好收窄任何討論嘅空間自劃界線
我批鬥嘅只限上面個條on9仔
一路屌人屈毛批鬥 一路批鬥港獨係弱智
【沈旭暉】《國安法》：中國眼中的「二次回歸」，與北京的二十大部署
Never侵B
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你可以追求最大公約數聯繫唔同派別對抗
但唔好好似上面條on9仔咁你一講獨就屌弱智 小朋友 自己去收窄自己人嘅討論空間
大家都係想要翻個自治權
你地可以認為同中共拉扯保持兩制個獨立性
但我價值觀會覺得齋靠保持翻原有嘅政治制度唔足夠去遊說國際香港保持到原有特性
呢個只係大家價值觀唔同對出路應該係點嘅睇法唔同
但我覺得唔好收窄任何討論嘅空間自劃界線
我批鬥嘅只限上面個條on9仔
一路屌人屈毛批鬥 一路批鬥港獨係弱智
但唔好好似上面條on9仔咁你一講獨就屌弱智 小朋友 自己去收窄自己人嘅討論空間
大家都係想要翻個自治權
你地可以認為同中共拉扯保持兩制個獨立性
但我價值觀會覺得齋靠保持翻原有嘅政治制度唔足夠去遊說國際香港保持到原有特性
呢個只係大家價值觀唔同對出路應該係點嘅睇法唔同
但我覺得唔好收窄任何討論嘅空間自劃界線
我批鬥嘅只限上面個條on9仔
一路屌人屈毛批鬥 一路批鬥港獨係弱智
推！
大佬你睇翻條on9仔講過啲咩先啦
唔通獨派有人屈人唔獨立係五毛就係批鬥
唔支持獨立嘅人批港獨係搞死運動就唔係批鬥咩
上面條友根本就唔係討論而係批鳩你班港獨嘅就係弱智 小朋友 睇唔清現實
瘋狂label人乜柒論點都冇淨係屌
我唔覺得我屌鳩佢有咩問題
唔通獨派有人屈人唔獨立係五毛就係批鬥
唔支持獨立嘅人批港獨係搞死運動就唔係批鬥咩
上面條友根本就唔係討論而係批鳩你班港獨嘅就係弱智 小朋友 睇唔清現實
瘋狂label人乜柒論點都冇淨係屌
我唔覺得我屌鳩佢有咩問題
Push
對，根本管治理念完全唔同。
最好互不干涉。
不過大陸係要搞呢搞路。
最好互不干涉。
不過大陸係要搞呢搞路。
英文 VERSION
with the help of google translate and self paraphrasing.
Welcome to amend it together.
1. Beijing believes that the epidemic has created an ideal opportunity for ‘settling’ Hong Kong 's situation, which is based on a basic assumption that the West is more severely affected by the epidemic than China and the economic recovery is slower than China. They believe that the west will not dare to stand against or decouple with China. Whether it is "War Wolf Diplomacy", "sharp power strikes", or Hong Kong's "National Security Law", it is a demonstration of realism brinksmanship. Just like the reclamation project of the South China Sea, no matter how strongly the international condemns, as long as there is no action, it is fact.
2. As a big winner of globalization in the past two decades, Beijing has long formed a "community of destiny" with elites worldwide. Although it is understood that "anti-China" has gradually become an international trend, the generation of "Chinese elite " will still be in power in countries for a least a decade. Self-interest becomes the pull factor for choosing the side of China. Nevertheless, it will not be surprised by the appearance of the"pro-China prosperity" political platform. This is the last strategic opportunity for China before the new values-dominated generation regains power.
3. Beijing is convinced that chambers of commerce in various countries only care about actual interests, and only worry about being extorted by the National Security Act due to the intimate contact with "foreign forces". However, as long as they will be surrounded by orders and favors at critical moments, the chamber of commerce will use its own lobbying group to enforcing anti-lobbying activities, jus like the British businessmen who were labeled as "selling Hong Kong" in the 1990s.
4. At the international level, the most qualified voice is the United Kingdom, but Beijing is convinced that the national power of the British is not as good as it used to be. It will only be gaming between China and the United States, and there will be no action or high profile gestures to give mandates to other countries. For example, the Chinese-British Joint Declaration has been unilaterally changed by China. In addition to withdrawing deployment companies from the United States in recent months, China has proposed to change to the United Kingdom for a public listing, which is a breakthrough. Trump is harsh on allies and believes in unilateralism. It is also the basis for Beijing to calculate that the West will not blindly follow the United States.
5. There can be many reactions from the United States. With the upcoming November election, politicians at all levels will use the anti-China card, but their ultimate goal is the vote they can get, while their actions is not matched with their stand. Based on the CCP ’s knowledge of human nature, it is determined that the United States will only pose sanction at most several subordinate officials (in the case of Xinjiang Secretary Chen Guoguo as an example), at which time it will be easy to appease the relevant persons by promoting them with a high-rank post, etc .; For listed Chinese companies and even further financial warfare, Beijing believes that American politicians, after calculating the pros and cons of their agents, will gently let go.
to be continued....
with the help of google translate and self paraphrasing.
Welcome to amend it together.
1. Beijing believes that the epidemic has created an ideal opportunity for ‘settling’ Hong Kong 's situation, which is based on a basic assumption that the West is more severely affected by the epidemic than China and the economic recovery is slower than China. They believe that the west will not dare to stand against or decouple with China. Whether it is "War Wolf Diplomacy", "sharp power strikes", or Hong Kong's "National Security Law", it is a demonstration of realism brinksmanship. Just like the reclamation project of the South China Sea, no matter how strongly the international condemns, as long as there is no action, it is fact.
2. As a big winner of globalization in the past two decades, Beijing has long formed a "community of destiny" with elites worldwide. Although it is understood that "anti-China" has gradually become an international trend, the generation of "Chinese elite " will still be in power in countries for a least a decade. Self-interest becomes the pull factor for choosing the side of China. Nevertheless, it will not be surprised by the appearance of the"pro-China prosperity" political platform. This is the last strategic opportunity for China before the new values-dominated generation regains power.
3. Beijing is convinced that chambers of commerce in various countries only care about actual interests, and only worry about being extorted by the National Security Act due to the intimate contact with "foreign forces". However, as long as they will be surrounded by orders and favors at critical moments, the chamber of commerce will use its own lobbying group to enforcing anti-lobbying activities, jus like the British businessmen who were labeled as "selling Hong Kong" in the 1990s.
4. At the international level, the most qualified voice is the United Kingdom, but Beijing is convinced that the national power of the British is not as good as it used to be. It will only be gaming between China and the United States, and there will be no action or high profile gestures to give mandates to other countries. For example, the Chinese-British Joint Declaration has been unilaterally changed by China. In addition to withdrawing deployment companies from the United States in recent months, China has proposed to change to the United Kingdom for a public listing, which is a breakthrough. Trump is harsh on allies and believes in unilateralism. It is also the basis for Beijing to calculate that the West will not blindly follow the United States.
5. There can be many reactions from the United States. With the upcoming November election, politicians at all levels will use the anti-China card, but their ultimate goal is the vote they can get, while their actions is not matched with their stand. Based on the CCP ’s knowledge of human nature, it is determined that the United States will only pose sanction at most several subordinate officials (in the case of Xinjiang Secretary Chen Guoguo as an example), at which time it will be easy to appease the relevant persons by promoting them with a high-rank post, etc .; For listed Chinese companies and even further financial warfare, Beijing believes that American politicians, after calculating the pros and cons of their agents, will gently let go.
to be continued....
6. Even if the United States claims that she will vigorously pose sanctions if the Hong Kong national law is passed, in international games, the exchange of chips does not necessarily have to be in the dispute itself. For example, in the second Taiwan strait crisis, China ’s official reason is to support the Middle East and contain the US military. The world thinks that the Soviet Union ’s missile crisis in Cuba surrendered, but they did not know that the US also withdrew its missiles in Turkey. Beijing believes that Hong Kong is China's core interest, but not the United States' core interest. Even if there is a concession, there are other chess for her to play, keeping the success of propaganda in Hong Kong.
7. At the local level, Beijing ’s basic strategy is to prevent the reappearance of parliamentary offensive and defensive war against Article 23 in 2003 and the Anti-Fugitive Offenders Regulations in 2019, so as to prevent moderate formations from vomiting or sympathizing for scrutinizing votes. As can be seen from the previous ballots, the "liberate camp/yellow camp" basic set is about 60%. Only the above two cases plus the "light blue" will lead to the landslide of public opinion. Beijing is doing its best to ensure that it does not appear again. It covers the very specifications of the entire business community, which is actually the "secondary return preparatory committee."
8. In the past, the "establishment/ pro-China camp" treats supporting the 23 articles and the extradition laws as hard work. This time, Beijing once again to gain pro-China camps support by offering them, high rank official positions. This is something that has not happened in the past. The 'pro-China camp' has never been more motivated than before in an attempt to maximize their interests. Even the most enlightened wise men of the establishment camp, they have been putting up a 'far-left politics' attitude lately.
9. In the face of Hong Kong people who are from the "pan-yellow camp" and all broad of groups which are anti-extradition law, Beijing differentiates them as the "mutual destruction camp". Although many claiming to be one of them, many of them only use this as a bargaining strategy rather than a goal, but many from the "light-blue camp" and "light-yellow camp" will conditionally think that "scramble" makes them losing their asset, the result they will slowly go back to the "pro-China camp", which is exactly the abacus for Beijing to construct the right to speak.
7. At the local level, Beijing ’s basic strategy is to prevent the reappearance of parliamentary offensive and defensive war against Article 23 in 2003 and the Anti-Fugitive Offenders Regulations in 2019, so as to prevent moderate formations from vomiting or sympathizing for scrutinizing votes. As can be seen from the previous ballots, the "liberate camp/yellow camp" basic set is about 60%. Only the above two cases plus the "light blue" will lead to the landslide of public opinion. Beijing is doing its best to ensure that it does not appear again. It covers the very specifications of the entire business community, which is actually the "secondary return preparatory committee."
8. In the past, the "establishment/ pro-China camp" treats supporting the 23 articles and the extradition laws as hard work. This time, Beijing once again to gain pro-China camps support by offering them, high rank official positions. This is something that has not happened in the past. The 'pro-China camp' has never been more motivated than before in an attempt to maximize their interests. Even the most enlightened wise men of the establishment camp, they have been putting up a 'far-left politics' attitude lately.
9. In the face of Hong Kong people who are from the "pan-yellow camp" and all broad of groups which are anti-extradition law, Beijing differentiates them as the "mutual destruction camp". Although many claiming to be one of them, many of them only use this as a bargaining strategy rather than a goal, but many from the "light-blue camp" and "light-yellow camp" will conditionally think that "scramble" makes them losing their asset, the result they will slowly go back to the "pro-China camp", which is exactly the abacus for Beijing to construct the right to speak.
係習上場係因 689 777係果
我諗其中一個問題就係支持者同論述者既分野，支持者好容易會複雜簡單化，將港獨視為唯一方案。將港獨同5大訴求/外國支持/中共反應/高度自治等一堆野綑綁埋一切，而忽略左一般普通人對以上嘅野都有唔同理解同底線，變相迫所有人歸邊。
same 無得打
無得拆
香港都郁得 台灣打硬
我估計10年內會打
諗下2008我係中國人啊hi 2014佔中前嘅香港 再到今日急速惡化成香港市 14去計係10年都無
今次反送中 國安法 支共搵到機會試到歐美列強嘅底線同反應 難聽講可以話全部都係紙老虎
今日搞香港你無實際行動 下個打台灣佢就理所當然地賭你美國唔出兵
諗下2008我係中國人啊hi 2014佔中前嘅香港 再到今日急速惡化成香港市 14去計係10年都無
今次反送中 國安法 支共搵到機會試到歐美列強嘅底線同反應 難聽講可以話全部都係紙老虎
今日搞香港你無實際行動 下個打台灣佢就理所當然地賭你美國唔出兵
俾你全部人都出 一樣反唔到港共
關鍵都係喺美國度
唔打仗無得搞
關鍵都係喺美國度
唔打仗無得搞
14時都有後生 經歷過唔係得你哋
小心佢借用洗黑錢為名/求其生安白做一d罪名去對付黃色經濟圈內幾間比較出名既舖頭
無錯，唔好下下等人餵
Full Tibet
97咗俾人賣咗豬仔係分別
但反送中前 我同你講支共會結束一國兩制攬炒白手套 你都未必信
習依家真正開始凡事去到盡 武統台灣可能性亦都大增 特別喺大選放魚意圖落一國兩制糖衣毒藥但失敗之後
所謂對美有重大戰略價值 島鏈 係咪就代表會為台出兵呢
但反送中前 我同你講支共會結束一國兩制攬炒白手套 你都未必信
習依家真正開始凡事去到盡 武統台灣可能性亦都大增 特別喺大選放魚意圖落一國兩制糖衣毒藥但失敗之後
所謂對美有重大戰略價值 島鏈 係咪就代表會為台出兵呢
一係join them做小粉紅 一係移民 無中間你做
基本上就一定
賭美國佬靠嚇 無料到 英國照樣座咗喺度 BNO 平權噏吓
有得玩就玩埋啲時間佢
有得玩就玩埋啲時間佢
即係點...