唔想再有手足被黑警自殺？用呢4個apps!

1

2

啱所有人用，尤其前線手足

希望大家可以幫P牌樓主推爆佢同埋試試啲apps

Thanks

Push

Push

Push

推

要自己搵方法/地方記低，否則開唔返backup，亦有被人搵到嘅風險，而backup密碼只係30位密碼

我亦都講過點可以將password / important chats安全地儲存 at little inconvenience (1Password / KeePassXC; Standard Notes / Nextcloud + LibreOffice).

Signal Groups 無人數限制、全部用一個安全嘅protocol to provide E2EE

問心果句，有幾多個人password 長過30 characters?

2. They continued, “Every popular messaging app offers its users some way to back up their messages to prevent data loss. Messaging apps that ignore backups (such as Wickr/Signal/Confide) never reach 1M DAU [Daily Active User] and remain niche.”

This is a misleading play of words as Signal could never know how many daily active users they have, as they collect almost no data about their users, as described above.

3. Telegram continues, “users don’t want to lose their entire message history when they lose/change their phones so apps of this kind never become massively popular. […] Secret Chats in Telegram or their copycat versions in Viber or Facebook Messenger [...] also provide e2ee and don’t get backed up).” They claim that the “[c]onsequence of people using [niche] apps can be targeted by governments as those who have something to hide. Due to the limited distribution of such apps, the government can identify and track individuals whose phones connect to the corresponding IP addresses.” It is difficult to see how governments could not track Telegram “Cloud Chat” users since all the chat logs of all users are all permanently stored and logged by Telegram servers in plaintext. In fact, governments can easily subpoena all user data collected by Telegram, and Telegram is legally forced to provide information to government or law enforcement agencies. Edward Snowden’s revelations showed that warrantless searches of private citizens’ records are commonplace and officers in 3-character government agencies can look up such records without even notifying the companies involved. If your service does not even stop mass surveillance, why would government agencies even bother with targeted surveillance?

4. Telegram boldly declares on January 16, 2017 that “WhatsApp's approach has other architectural drawbacks that invalidate end-to-end encryption for 99% of private conversations” (https://telegra.ph/whatsapp-backdoor-01-16), citing an exaggerated news piece from The Guardian, which editors later admitted lacked technical proofreading, that there was a “backdoor” in WhatsApp. This claim caused an outcry amongst 72 security researchers and was likened to the ludicrous claim that “VACCINES KILL PEOPLE” (https://web.archive.org/web/20190724011112/http://technosociology.org/?page_id=1687 and https://signal.org/blog/there-is-no-whatsapp-backdoor/). It is extraordinary that Telegram, a company that appeals to authority by claiming to be consisted of elite PhDs everytime someone poses technical challenges against their MTProto, could conjure the claim that 99% of WhatsApp chats are insecure, and this was soundly refuted by the researchers:

“The imagined attack on WhatsApp […] is a remote scenario requiring an adversary capable of many difficult feats. Even then, the threat would involve only those few undelivered messages, if they exist at all, between the time the recipient changes their phone and the user receives a warning.
In the full scheme of things, this is a small and unlikely threat. The preconditions of the attack (which is not a backdoor) would in practice mean that the attacker had many other ways of getting at their target.”

Despite the fact that The Guardian has withdrawn the claim eight hours after initial online publication on January 13, 2017 (https://www.theguardian.com/technology/commentisfree/2017/jun/28/flawed-reporting-about-whatsapp), Telegram continues to cite the news article they published three days after the retraction and passes this long-withdrawn claim as fact, whilst conveniently not bothering to offer a single word on what the “backdoor” was, despite the “alternative fact” that WhatsApp and its underlying Signal Protocol was “backdoored”, was the presupposition and the conclusion of the article.

Telegram’s blog post continued by paraphrasing WhatsApp’s FAQ, and inciting users’ fear by reminding everyone that WhatsApp is acquired by Facebook. While WhatsApp does collect and report metadata about users, it has nothing to do with this “backdoor”, which concerns end-to-end encryption of a very small subset of messages. The blog post reasons that because WhatsApp does not enable security notifications by default, WhatsApp does not provide end-to-end encryption whilst Telegram never provided any form of end-to-end encryption by default all the while. They boasted that the “Telegram way” of rescuing the poor users who have to trust a company is to have them trust Telegram instead. (As described by them: “Telegram's Cloud Chats offer server-client encryption and secure in-house backups”, which if translated to English, means “Telegram’s unencrypted chats use HTTPS only, and your chats are being processed and stored on our servers, which run on hardware unbeknownst to its users, with source code concealed from public view, just like the insecure Google and iCloud servers. Our offering is a telecommunications app, but we are sure that companies who have managed servers for decades must be inferior to us, a startup that has barely been founded for 3 years [at the time].)

5. “Unlike what you have in niche apps, […] on Telegram, in cloud chats our servers do have access to the encryption key, so individuals can not be singled out and targeted based on the fact that they use secret chats and thus have something to hide.” I honestly could not believe this came out of the blog post of a messaging service that claims to offer end-to-end encryption. When you say, ‘I have nothing to hide,’ you’re saying, ‘I don’t care about this right.’ You’re saying, ‘I don’t have this right, because I’ve got to the point where I have to justify it.’ If individuals have privacy rights, then invoking ‘nothing to hide’ is irrelevant. I guess at least they were right when they said users of end-to-end encrypted instant messaging cannot afford to have something to hide, because every Telegram user have been robbed of their rights and cannot expect any privacy whatsoever.

The one thing this PhD in Philology did well however, is to delude Telegram users into thinking their conversations are secure in the hands of the UAE-headquartered company, where human right records are stellar. 大陰蒂國 (United Kondom) is the legal domicile of the company, wherein the RIP Act of 2000 requires persons to self-incriminate by disclosing passwords to government representatives. Failure to do so is a criminal offense, with a penalty of up to five years in jail. This policy is so deprival to natural rights, even the CCP didn’t dare to enact a similar policy until late 2019. Telegram then challenged the whole cryptanalysis field by issuing a challenge that is impossible to refute in an attempt to trick the public into thinking Telegram is uncrackable. (see next comment)