
over the past decade, all growth in global oil production came from U.S. shale and other non-conventional sources such as Canadian tar sands. We know from official comments following President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia that the kingdom is currently “pumping” at capacity and will be able to boost output by only one million barrels per day by 2025 and then “no more”. In light of that, consider that production from shale fields has peaked and recall some recent comments from the largest shale operator in the U.S. that more drilling would harm the shale industry (see here). It appears to me that unless the U.S. nationalizes shale oil fields and starts to drill for oil itself to boost production, over the next three to five years, we’re looking at an inelastic supply of oil and gas...
...and of that inelastic supply:
(1) China will get a bigger share at a discount, invoiced in renminbi.
(2) China will export more downstream products at a wider margin, and... (3) China will lure more firms like BASF with discounted energy bills.
(4) Iran, with Chinese capital, will do more downstream exports too, and... (5) GCC countries, with Chinese capital, ditto, most likely for renminbi.
The “new paradigm”, as I see it, comes with a theme of “emancipation”: both sanctioned and non-sanctioned members of OPEC, with Chinese capital, are going to adopt the “farm-to-table” model in which they will not just sell oil but will also refine more of it and process more of it into high value-added petrochemical products. Given supply constraints over “the next three to five years”, this will likely be at the expense of refiners and petrochemical firms in the West, and also growth in the West. All this means much less domestic production and more inflation as steadily price-inflating alternatives are imported from the East.
And this is not just about oil and gas...