https://www.hudson.org/competition-china-debating-endgame-alex-wong
https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/24/11/23/n14377377.htm
當選美副國安顧問 黃之瀚有哪些對華觀點
更新: 2024年11月24日 5:59 AM
當選美副國安顧問 黃之瀚有哪些對華觀點
2024年8月8日，美國共和黨總統候選人、前總統川普（特朗普）在佛州海湖莊園召開記者會。(Joe Raedle/Getty Images)
【大紀元2024年11月24日訊】（大紀元記者林燕報導）前美國國務院官員黃之瀚（Alex Wong）將出任當選總統川普（特朗普）政府的副國家安全顧問和總統助理。
黃之瀚曾在川普第一任期時擔任朝鮮問題副特別代表和國務院朝鮮問題副助理國務卿，並代表官方出訪台灣。他也曾擔任過國會特設機構美中經濟與安全審查委員會（USCC）主席。現在他是智庫「哈德遜研究所」（Hudson Institute）的高級研究員，同時也是全球台灣研究所的副總裁。
川普挑選他擔任副國家安全顧問，可以給緊張的印太地區，尤其是台灣地區投射更多的信任度。如台灣總統賴清德競選期間辦公室發言人趙怡翔所說，川普的用人選擇將使太平洋地區的盟友相信，美國將繼續支持他們抵抗北京脅迫和恐嚇。
「中共的戰略選擇早已註定了殘局」
黃之瀚2023年在里根總統基金會及研究所網站上發表了一篇題為「與中國（中共）的競爭：關於殘局的辯論」（Competition with China: Debating the Endgame）的文章，系統概述他對美中競爭關係方向的思考。
「中共的戰略選擇早已註定了殘局。」黃之瀚寫道，「無論美國尋求與中國（中共）緩和關係還是（北京）在國內推行民主，中共都將面臨越來越多的合法性困境。」
他提議，美國戰略是否奏效的明確指標是中共是否在經濟、安全和國際政治領域陷入更深的合法性困境，因為中共一開始就選擇將其合法性建立在削弱美國利益的基礎上。
「殘局」一詞源於國際象棋。國際象棋理論講「開局」、「中局」和「殘局」。「開局」是對弈雙方開始布置陣形、子力的階段；「中局」是子力布置完畢而開始進行纏鬥的階段；「殘局」是中局纏鬥告一段落，進入最後決鬥的階段，也是勝、負、和三種結果見分曉的最後階段。
他在文章中提到，幾年前，關於中美關係應該定位「競爭」或「接觸」的爭論仍是美國外交政策界的熱門話題。但這一爭論現已塵埃落定。美國外交界已形成了一種近乎共識，即美中關係是競爭性的，而且在很多方面是對抗性的。
「這場辯論現在轉向戰略核心問題：我們在競爭什麼？美中關係以及中國（中共）本身的最終願景——『殘局』是什麼，這將指導我們如何制定政策？我們通過什麼目標來判斷美國是贏還是輸？」他寫道。
黃之瀚指出，從文獻上看，美國外交界對「殘局」的理解可概括為兩派，一派尋求更加多元化的中國，並最終取代中國共產黨的統治，另一派尋求跟中國共產黨找平衡和緩和，他們認為中國共產黨本身超出了美國政策的審慎影響。
根據他的觀察，雖然這些概括比較簡單，但辯論參與方都提出了各種微妙的、相互重疊又來自不同門類的論點，而且大多都給出了相同的政策處方。比如：呼籲美國增加軍費開支，增加盟國防禦合作，實施更嚴格的技術和投資限制，建立供應鏈彈性，消除中國（中共）影響力行動，並揭露中共獨裁和種族滅絕統治的破壞行為。
他表示，這場爭論可能源於這樣一個現實——「中共的戰略選擇早已註定了殘局」。
中共自陷合法性困境 其不當行為無法被美接受
黃之瀚表示，中共將其國內合法性——以及最終的統治能力——建立在咄咄逼人的國際大戰略基礎上。雖然說任何一個國家的國內政策和外交政策都沒有明確界限，但對中國（中共）來說，其國際願景與維持其國內統治之間的聯繫之深、之蓄意和之重要是不言而喻的。
「為了使其統治合法化，中共依靠的手段包括不平衡的重商主義貿易，由外國投資和技術機密（竊取或無償提供）推動的創新，在國際上以強迫獲取的政治默許，違反國際公約對所謂的國內『不安分』少數群體的鎮壓，強行宣告領土要求，以及增強其地區軍事強權地位。換句話說，中共的列寧主義制度不僅與自由主義秩序不相容（確實如此）。相反，更危險的是，它依賴鑽自由秩序的空子來維持生存。」他寫道。
他表示，無論是從自由主義意識形態立場還是從更根植於古典現實主義的角度來看，中共的這些行為都是美國及其夥伴無法接受的情況，都要求美國限制和切斷中共的這些濫用、不平衡和脅迫的管道。
中共的寄生戰略已將美國逼入最後的反制階段
他很贊同長期戰略智庫總裁傑奎琳‧迪爾（Jacqueline Deal）的觀察。迪爾提出對中共的反制策略「擠壓」，反擊中共濫用權力以及維護美國的利益，同時她也指出，美國的反制行動將直接在中共體制內產生影響。
黃之瀚表示，無論美國是否有意對付中共，但美國的國家戰略都將不可避免地對中共的國內統治產生壓力。
例如，如果美國採取措施保護其合作夥伴和自身免受中共的經濟和政治脅迫，會不會被說，這是對中共用來為其統治辯護的民族主義的挑戰？
如果美國執行國際海事法，捍衛不侵略準則，並尋求通過增加美國在該地區的軍事存在，來維持其進入印度-太平洋地區的通道和台灣海峽的和平，會不會被說，這是對中共所謂大部分歷史合法性及其軍事建設所依據的「領土完整」的明確挑戰？
如果美國尋求恢復世界貿易體系的互惠原則，制止中共大規模盜竊知識產權，並對可能用於對付我們自己和盟友公民的戰略技術進行控制，會不會被說，這是故意試圖切斷中國經濟增長和技術專制主義的驅動力？
黃之瀚說，答案當然是「不是」。
「這些行動是基於自由、自由秩序下的繁榮。但這些問題及其答案都表明，中共對自由秩序和美國經濟的寄生，已經將美國逼入了最後階段，無論我們是否願意，我們對中國（中共）戰略的合理反擊都會給中共帶來合法性困境。」他寫道。
不應因害怕北京激烈反應 美國就屈從於中共
在他看來，美國的反制策略將不可避免會影響到中共的國內統治，並引發中共激烈反應和攻擊，但這並不意味著美國就該止步。
黃之瀚說：「我們必須接受這一現實。中共將對美國的反擊作出激烈反應，並指責我們破壞中國社會。但這不是停止推行我們政策的理由。
「撇開中共，並不等於可以避諱其積極破壞美國社會凝聚力這一事實不談。撇開這一事實，並不等於我們應該被迫讓美國及盟友的利益屈服於中共戰略和中共黨國。
「相反，中共陷入在經濟、安全和國際政治領域更大的合法性困境，將成為美國戰略是否奏效的明確指標。這正是因為中共選擇將其合法性建立在削弱美國利益的基礎之上的必然結果。」
美國及美國人必須為美中緊張局勢做好準備
他說，美國及其人民必須為二戰結束以來從未見過的緊張局勢、地區不穩定，以及可能的衝突做好準備。
「我說的是二戰而不是冷戰，因為未來的風險比冷戰中的風險更令人擔憂。事實上，確保我們與中國（中共）的競爭保持與蘇聯競爭一樣的『冷戰』狀態，對我們來說是一項更艱巨的任務。」黃之瀚寫道。
他表示，冷戰時期美國的遏制戰略旨在維持蘇聯周邊的邊界，蘇聯要麼在共產主義自身固有的內部矛盾壓力下「軟化」，要麼崩潰，而中共強加給美國的「殘局」則具有不同性質，也更加危險。
「當中共將其統治建立在金融和技術投入，以及自由秩序的戰利品之上，當其霸權和領土野心延伸到美國安全保障、保證和規範執行所覆蓋的地區時，幾乎沒有空間進行間接的冷戰式代理競爭。」黃之瀚說。
他預計，當美國開始反制中共時，中共更可能將美國政策視為對其的直接威脅，並考慮採取更直接的行動，包括軍事侵略。
「50年前在中美關係正式開啟時中方的『開局』策略，自上世紀80年代以來北京利用自由秩序進行經濟擴張的『中局』策略，以及我們當前地緣政治博弈中棋盤上剩下的棋子，在很大程度上構成了中美『殘局』的參數。」黃之瀚總結說，最後剩下的就是看誰輸、誰贏。
責任編輯：林妍#
黃之瀚2023年曾發表美中關係文章：不應因害怕北京激烈反應 美國就屈從於中共
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https://www.hudson.org/competition-china-debating-endgame-alex-wong
Oct 16, 2023
Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute
Competition with China: Debating the Endgame
Alex Wong
It was only a few short years ago that the debate between “competition” versus “engagement” in U.S.-China relations was a hot one in the U.S. foreign policy community. It is now largely settled. What has formed is a near-consensus that—like it or not—our relationship with China is competitive. And in many respects, it is adversarial.
The debate has now moved to the central question of strategy: what are we competing for? What is the ultimate vision for our relations with China and for China itself—the “endgame”—toward which we can craft our policies? What is the objective by which we will know if the United States has won or lost?
While those appear on the surface to be clear questions, the “endgame” debate is by no means simple and clean. You could generalize the recent literature as being divided between those, on one hand, who seek the ultimate replacement of Chinese Communist Party-rule with a more pluralistic China, and those, on other hand, who seek balance and détente with a CCP whose nature they feel is beyond the prudent influence of U.S. policy. But that would be an oversimplification.
What I sense instead is that participants in this debate offer a diverse array of nuanced arguments that overlap and do not coalesce into distinct sides. And—more often than not—they share many of the same policy prescriptions. I could present you with multiple articles that call for the United States to bolster military spending, increase allied defense cooperation, implement harder technological and investment strictures, build supply chain resiliency, neutralize Chinese influence operations, and cast a light on the depredations of the CCP’s authoritarian and genocidal rule. You would be hard pressed to identify which articles support what general vision for the U.S.-China endgame.
The muddled nature of this debate is not a reflection of the intellect or skill of the writers and policymakers. Instead, it may stem from a reality in which the endgame has already been predestined by the strategic choices of the CCP. It is a reality in which regardless of whether the United States pursues détente with China or democracy within it, the CCP will increasingly be presented with dilemmas for its legitimacy.
This is because the CCP has based its domestic legitimacy—and its ultimate capacity to rule—on an aggressive international grand strategy. Now, it is axiomatic that there is never a clear delineation for any country of where its domestic policies and foreign policies begin and end. But for China, the linkage between the realization of its international vision and the perpetuation of its domestic rule is unusually deep, deliberate, and essential. To legitimate its rule, the CCP relies on unbalanced mercantilist trade, innovation fueled by foreign investment and technological know-how (either stolen or freely given), coerced international political acquiescence, domestic repression of “restive” minorities in violation of international conventions, actualization of territorial claims, and growing its regional military dominance. In other words, the CCP’s Leninist system is not just incompatible with the liberal order (although it very much is). It is instead, more threateningly, dependent on the abuse of the liberal order for continued survival.
⋯⋯⋯
Oct 16, 2023
Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute
Competition with China: Debating the Endgame
Alex Wong
It was only a few short years ago that the debate between “competition” versus “engagement” in U.S.-China relations was a hot one in the U.S. foreign policy community. It is now largely settled. What has formed is a near-consensus that—like it or not—our relationship with China is competitive. And in many respects, it is adversarial.
The debate has now moved to the central question of strategy: what are we competing for? What is the ultimate vision for our relations with China and for China itself—the “endgame”—toward which we can craft our policies? What is the objective by which we will know if the United States has won or lost?
While those appear on the surface to be clear questions, the “endgame” debate is by no means simple and clean. You could generalize the recent literature as being divided between those, on one hand, who seek the ultimate replacement of Chinese Communist Party-rule with a more pluralistic China, and those, on other hand, who seek balance and détente with a CCP whose nature they feel is beyond the prudent influence of U.S. policy. But that would be an oversimplification.
What I sense instead is that participants in this debate offer a diverse array of nuanced arguments that overlap and do not coalesce into distinct sides. And—more often than not—they share many of the same policy prescriptions. I could present you with multiple articles that call for the United States to bolster military spending, increase allied defense cooperation, implement harder technological and investment strictures, build supply chain resiliency, neutralize Chinese influence operations, and cast a light on the depredations of the CCP’s authoritarian and genocidal rule. You would be hard pressed to identify which articles support what general vision for the U.S.-China endgame.
The muddled nature of this debate is not a reflection of the intellect or skill of the writers and policymakers. Instead, it may stem from a reality in which the endgame has already been predestined by the strategic choices of the CCP. It is a reality in which regardless of whether the United States pursues détente with China or democracy within it, the CCP will increasingly be presented with dilemmas for its legitimacy.
This is because the CCP has based its domestic legitimacy—and its ultimate capacity to rule—on an aggressive international grand strategy. Now, it is axiomatic that there is never a clear delineation for any country of where its domestic policies and foreign policies begin and end. But for China, the linkage between the realization of its international vision and the perpetuation of its domestic rule is unusually deep, deliberate, and essential. To legitimate its rule, the CCP relies on unbalanced mercantilist trade, innovation fueled by foreign investment and technological know-how (either stolen or freely given), coerced international political acquiescence, domestic repression of “restive” minorities in violation of international conventions, actualization of territorial claims, and growing its regional military dominance. In other words, the CCP’s Leninist system is not just incompatible with the liberal order (although it very much is). It is instead, more threateningly, dependent on the abuse of the liberal order for continued survival.
⋯⋯⋯
That is an unacceptable state of affairs for the United States and our partners, whether viewed from either a liberal ideological posture or one more rooted in classical realism. Either approach demands that U.S. policy attempt to bracket and cut off these avenues for abuse, imbalance, and coercion. In her essay, Dr. Deal helpfully labels this counter-strategy one of “extrusion.” That strategy—one of countering the CCP’s abuses and defending our interests—will inevitably have the effect of straining the CCP’s domestic rule—whether we aim to or not.
If, for instance, the United States establishes measures to insulate partners and itself from Chinese economic and political coercion, is that a deliberate challenge to the nationalist “Middle Kingdom” mythos the CCP leverages to justify its rule?
If the United States enforces international maritime law, defends norms of non-aggression, and seeks to maintain its access to the Indo-Pacific region and peace across the Taiwan Strait with an increased U.S. military presence in the region, is that an explicit challenge to the “territorial integrity” upon which the CCP bases much of its historical legitimacy and motivates its military buildup?
If the United States seeks to restore the reciprocal principles of the world trading system, halt China’s massive theft of intellectual property, and place controls on strategic technologies that could be turned against our own citizens and those of our allies, is that a deliberate attempt to close off the drivers of Chinese economic growth and techno-authoritarianism that maintain the CCP’s grip on power?
Certainly not. These are actions that fall well within a defense of U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity within a liberal order. But these questions and their answers point to the fact that the CCP’s parasitic abuse of both the liberal order and the U.S. economy has backed the United States into an endgame where—regardless of whether we seek to or not—our reasonable counters to Chinese strategy will create legitimacy dilemmas for the CCP.
And we have to get comfortable with that reality. The CCP will react stridently to U.S. countermoves and accuse us of undermining Chinese society. That’s not a reason to halt the pursuit of our policies. Put aside the fact that the CCP itself is not shy about actively undermining the cohesion of U.S. society. And put aside the fact that we should not be obliged to subjugate U.S. and allied interests to CCP strategy and the continuance of the party state in China. Rather, the proliferation of legitimacy dilemmas for the CCP—in the economic, security, and international political realms—will be a clear metric of whether U.S. strategy is working. This is precisely because the CCP has chosen to predicate its legitimacy on the diminishment of U.S. interests.
This is not a pleasant reality. In fact, it is exceedingly dangerous. The United States and its people have to be prepared for a level of tension, regional destabilization, and—yes—possible conflict that we have not seen since the end of World War II. I deliberately say World War II and not the Cold War because the risks that lie ahead are more worrying than those that existed in the Cold War. It is in fact a more difficult task for us to ensure that our competition with China remains as “cold” as the Soviet competition ended up being.
⋯⋯
If, for instance, the United States establishes measures to insulate partners and itself from Chinese economic and political coercion, is that a deliberate challenge to the nationalist “Middle Kingdom” mythos the CCP leverages to justify its rule?
If the United States enforces international maritime law, defends norms of non-aggression, and seeks to maintain its access to the Indo-Pacific region and peace across the Taiwan Strait with an increased U.S. military presence in the region, is that an explicit challenge to the “territorial integrity” upon which the CCP bases much of its historical legitimacy and motivates its military buildup?
If the United States seeks to restore the reciprocal principles of the world trading system, halt China’s massive theft of intellectual property, and place controls on strategic technologies that could be turned against our own citizens and those of our allies, is that a deliberate attempt to close off the drivers of Chinese economic growth and techno-authoritarianism that maintain the CCP’s grip on power?
Certainly not. These are actions that fall well within a defense of U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity within a liberal order. But these questions and their answers point to the fact that the CCP’s parasitic abuse of both the liberal order and the U.S. economy has backed the United States into an endgame where—regardless of whether we seek to or not—our reasonable counters to Chinese strategy will create legitimacy dilemmas for the CCP.
And we have to get comfortable with that reality. The CCP will react stridently to U.S. countermoves and accuse us of undermining Chinese society. That’s not a reason to halt the pursuit of our policies. Put aside the fact that the CCP itself is not shy about actively undermining the cohesion of U.S. society. And put aside the fact that we should not be obliged to subjugate U.S. and allied interests to CCP strategy and the continuance of the party state in China. Rather, the proliferation of legitimacy dilemmas for the CCP—in the economic, security, and international political realms—will be a clear metric of whether U.S. strategy is working. This is precisely because the CCP has chosen to predicate its legitimacy on the diminishment of U.S. interests.
This is not a pleasant reality. In fact, it is exceedingly dangerous. The United States and its people have to be prepared for a level of tension, regional destabilization, and—yes—possible conflict that we have not seen since the end of World War II. I deliberately say World War II and not the Cold War because the risks that lie ahead are more worrying than those that existed in the Cold War. It is in fact a more difficult task for us to ensure that our competition with China remains as “cold” as the Soviet competition ended up being.
⋯⋯
Whereas the U.S. Cold War strategy of containment aimed to maintain a perimeter around the Soviet Union within which it would either “mellow” or collapse under the weight of Communism’s own inherent internal contradictions, the endgame the CCP has forced upon us is of a different and more dangerous nature. The required U.S. counter actions that Dr. Deal cogently outlines in her essay will in fact directly create contradictions in the CCP’s chosen system. When the CCP has so predicated its rule on financial and technological inputs and spoils from the liberal order, and when its hegemonic and territorial ambitions extend to geographies covered by U.S. security guarantees, assurances, and norm enforcement, there is little space for indirect Cold War-style competition by proxy. The CCP is therefore more likely to view U.S. policy as direct threats. They, in turn, will consider more direct action themselves, including military aggression.
* * *
The term “endgame” arises from chess. Chess theory indicates that the shape of an “endgame” is largely influenced by players’ opening moves and the choices they make in the “middlegame” of a match.
That is very much the situation we are in now with China. China’s initial stratagem at the literal opening of U.S.-China relations 50 years ago, its “middlegame” moves to leverage the liberal order to expand economically since the 1980s, and the pieces left on the board in our current geopolitical game have largely structured the parameters of the U.S.-China endgame.
The remaining uncertainty is who will win.
* * *
The term “endgame” arises from chess. Chess theory indicates that the shape of an “endgame” is largely influenced by players’ opening moves and the choices they make in the “middlegame” of a match.
That is very much the situation we are in now with China. China’s initial stratagem at the literal opening of U.S.-China relations 50 years ago, its “middlegame” moves to leverage the liberal order to expand economically since the 1980s, and the pieces left on the board in our current geopolitical game have largely structured the parameters of the U.S.-China endgame.
The remaining uncertainty is who will win.
換句話說，中共的列寧主義制度不僅與自由主義秩序不相容（確實如此）。相反，更危險的是，它依賴鑽自由秩序的空子來維持生存。」他寫道。
遲知總好過唔知
遲知總好過唔知
睇得勁透徹
有呢類人才出現，就已經完全凸顯咗兩種制度下，邊一種更優越
一方面擁護自由，精英主義，汰弱留強；一方面係權力至上，用人唯親
如果最後由咁撚落後迂腐嘅制度勝出，啫係話人類呢幾千年嘅進步完全係白費，而我幾肯定唔會發生
有呢類人才出現，就已經完全凸顯咗兩種制度下，邊一種更優越
一方面擁護自由，精英主義，汰弱留強；一方面係權力至上，用人唯親
如果最後由咁撚落後迂腐嘅制度勝出，啫係話人類呢幾千年嘅進步完全係白費，而我幾肯定唔會發生
呢個人睇得好通透。 支那尋求梗嗰隻唔係win win雙贏， 而係支那win twice. 某啲情況， 什至自損800都要美國損1000。 支那係存心想破壞同取代美國成為世界霸主。 根本係納粹， 唔係蘇聯。
鑽空子無恥地做寄生蟲再控制宿主
家庭背景可能都有啲影響 父母可能都係反共
除咗拎港豬做出氣袋，共產黨會有乜激烈反應?
Say符康kong 會唔會老屈佢同黃之峰有關係
但係黃之峰契媽唔係咁諗喎
美國有屈就中國咩?
美國打唔痛中國就見到
制裁晶片? 所以人地宜家可以自制lu
加關稅? 取消埋出口退稅 幫你加定先
再整就再同你加碼
怕你有牙咩
美國打唔痛中國就見到
制裁晶片? 所以人地宜家可以自制lu
加關稅? 取消埋出口退稅 幫你加定先
再整就再同你加碼
怕你有牙咩
所有黃之X都由囯安處評估
坦白從寬
坦白從寬
this way sir
唔知新政府余茂春有冇一席位
一盆棋 捉完 分完勝負 可以玩下一盆再開局再捉過 問題係 咪撚比佢有翻身機會 再捉棋再也文也武
反骨仔